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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: 
 
 Good morning.  My name is Adam Levitin.  I am an Associate Professor of Law at the 
Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C., where I teach courses in bankruptcy, 
commercial law, contracts, and structured finance.  My research and writing focus on consumer 
finance and corporate bankruptcies.  In particular, I have written about the obstacles to mortgage 
modification in the current crisis.  I have also recently served as Special Counsel for Mortgage 
Affairs for the Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and am 
currently the Robert Zinman Resident Scholar at the American Bankruptcy Institute.  The views 
I express today are my own.   
I.  Where We Are Now 
 We are now well into the third year of the foreclosure crisis, and there is no end in sight.  
Since 2007 between five and six million homes entered foreclosure.  As of March 31, 2009, the 
Mortgage Bankers Association reported that 3.85% of residential mortgage loans were currently 
already in foreclosure, a rate nearly quadruple historical averages.  (See Chart 1.)  Additionally, 
5.65% of mortgages were more than 60 days delinquent and 9.12% were at least a month 
delinquent.  By the end of 2010, another 7 million homes are expected to enter foreclosure.1  
Unless the crisis is abated, by the time it runs its course, as many as one in five residential 
borrowers will have gone into foreclosure. 
Chart 1:  Percentage of 1-4 Family Residential Mortgages in Foreclosure2 
 
                                                 
1 Not Much Relief, NEW YORK TIMES, July 5, 2009, at WK7. 
2 Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Surveys 
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 Private lenders, industry associations, and two successive administrations have made a 
variety of efforts to mitigate the crisis and encourage loan modifications and refinancings, 
including a series of much vaunted initiatives—the HOPE Now Alliance, FHASecure, 
Hope4Homeowners, and the Making Home Affordable Program—but these have only had what 
can charitably be described as limited success.  There is still limited data on the Making Home 
Affordable Program, and it shows greater promise than past initiatives, but there is no indication 
that it will affect a substantial shift in the foreclosure balance.  Instead, these programs all seem 
like exercises in rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.   
 Unfortunately, there is still no consensus on why we are seeing so few loan 
modifications, even with tremendous government incentive payments to mortgage servicers.  
Some have argued that securitization structures create a variety of obstacles to loan modification, 
including outright contractual prohibitions and limitations, litigation risk, and adverse incentives 
for the servicers who make the modification decisions.3  Others have argued that factors like 
redefault risk and self-cure risk make loan modification a poor bet economically for mortgagees, 
and that the simple reason modifications are not happening is that they are not profitable, even 
compared to losses of sixty cents on the dollar in foreclosure.4  Others have pointed to factors 
like lack of servicer experience and capacity in loan modification.5  And of course these are 
hardly exclusive positions.  Different factors may play different roles depending on the particular 
mortgagee.   
 Whatever the explanation for lack of modifications, we are presented with the 
inescapable fact that a distressingly large number of American families are losing their homes.  
These families are not just speculators who were looking to flip homes or cash out equity on 
refinancings or even greedy purchasers who bought McMansions they really couldn’t afford by 
putting little money down in hopes of quickly accumulating home equity in an appreciating 
market.  These families now include people who played by the traditional mortgage market rules, 
put their 20% down, got traditional fixed-rate mortgages, and bought houses that in normal 
market conditions would be within their means.   
We are also presented with the terrible knowledge that the foreclosures are not about to 
stop anytime soon.  In fact, they are likely to get much worse.   
II.  The Shifting Causes of Default and Foreclosures  
The foreclosure crisis has gone in waves of defaults.  First there were the speculators, 
who borrowed close to 100% of property values and maybe more with construction mortgages.  
As soon as property values flattened, much less dropped, they bailed, as the costs of carrying the 
mortgages was more than the appreciation that they anticipated receiving on sale.  Many of these 
loans were non-recourse and the speculators simply walked away.   
Next came a wave of defaults caused by payment reset shock, primarily from expiration 
of teaser rates on hybrid ARMs.  Hybrid ARMs have a fixed teaser rate for one to three years, 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts:  Workout Prohibitions in 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
4 See, e.g., Manuel Adelino, Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-
Cures, and Securitization, Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 09-4, July 6, 2009, at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0904.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., Congressional Oversight Panel, The Foreclosure Crisis:  Working Toward a Solution, at 
http://cop.senate.gov/reports/library/report-030609-cop.cfm. 
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and then an adjustable rate that is usually substantially higher.  (These loans are often called 
2/28s or 3/27s, with the numerator in reference to the length of the teaser and the denominator in 
reference to the remaining term of the mortgage.)  The teaser rate made occupancy for the teaser 
period quite affordable.  Many hybrid ARMs were subprime loans, meaning that they were at a 
substantially above-market rate.  Sometimes this was because of the risk posed by the borrower, 
sometimes it was because the borrower wanted to get a low teaser rate by gambling on the ability 
to refinance later when the teaser expired, and sometimes it was simply because prime borrowers 
were duped or steered into taking out these mortgages. 
Homeowners who took out hybrid ARMs anticipated being able to refinance the 
properties when the teaser rate expired.  A refinancing, however, requires some equity in the 
property (and in the declining market, substantial equity in the property).  Many of these 
mortgages were made by homeowners who had little equity in the property to begin with, but 
who anticipated accumulating it quickly in the appreciating market of the housing bubble.  When 
the market fell, they lacked the equity to refinance.  What’s more, many faced stiff prepayment 
penalties if they refinanced.   
As a result, they were stuck with the hybrid ARMs when the teaser period expired.  Most 
of these loans had been underwritten based on an ability to pay the teaser rate, rather than the 
reset rate, and even the teaser rate underwriting was often a stretch.  When the rates reset, 
payment on these mortgages was frequently unaffordable, and even when it was, the 
homeowners were caught with negative equity and facing a declining market.  The result was 
another wave of defaults.   
Many of the hybrid ARMs were made in 2005 and 2006 with two-year teasers.  Many of 
the teaser expirations have already occurred, so this wave has crested, and low interest rates have 
mitigated some of the rate reset effect.  There are, however, also a significant number of so-
called 5/1 ARMs with a rate reset occurring five years after the loan’s origination.  The rate 
resets on the 5/1s underwritten during the bubble still lie ahead.   
 Now we are looking at another wave of defaults from interest rate resets, this time on so-
called pick-a-pay or pay-option ARMs.  Pay-option ARMs permit the borrower to choose the 
level of monthly payment.  Typically there are four choices—as if the loan were amortizing over 
15 years; as if the loan were amortizing over 30 years; interest only (non-amortizing); and 
negatively amortizing.  The interest rate in a pay-option ARM is always adjustable based on an 
index rate.  Pay-option ARMs generally have negative amortization limits.  If there is too much 
negative amortization (often 10-15%), then the loan will be recast into an amortizing ARM.  If 
the homeowner has been making too many payments at the negatively amortizing rate, the 
payment shock of the reset will be significant.  Moreover, because these loans are negatively 
amortizing, they would be difficult to refinance even in a good market, but in a falling market 
they are impossible to refinance because they are underwater.   
Most pay-option ARMs were not subprime loans.  Instead, they were made to prime 
borrowers, but were often underwritten with reduced documentation, making them so-called 
“Alt-A” loans.  Credit Suisse has estimated that most of the pay-option ARM market will be 
experiencing rate resets over the next two years (see graphic below).  Again, while low interest 
rates will mitigate the payment reset shock, the switch from negative amortization to positive 
amortization alone will result in a greatly increased monthly payment for many pay-option 
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borrowers, who will then be confronted with making significantly greater monthly payments for 
a property in which they have no equity.  
 
 
The fourth wave of defaults has already begun, and the worst is still ahead of us.  This 
wave is fueled by a declining market, as underwater homeowners with no prospect of positive 
equity in the near future strategically default on their mortgages.  (By strategic default, I mean 
default by a homeowner who can pay a mortgage, but does not because it is not economically 
sensible to do so.)  A number of studies have identified negative equity as a, if not the, primary 
factor in current foreclosures.6   
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Congressional Oversight Panel, The Foreclosure Crisis:  Working Toward a Solution, at 
http://cop.senate.gov/reports/library/report-030609-cop.cfm; Stan Leibowitz, New Evidence on the Foreclosure 
Crisis, Wall St. J., July 3, 2009 at A13; Michael LaCouer-Little, Follow the Money:  A Close Look at Recent 
Southern California Foreclosures, Mar. 5, 2009, paper presented at the American Real Estate and Urban Economics 
Association 2009 Mid-Year Meeting, at http://www.areuea.org/conferences/papers/download.phtml?id=2133. 
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For homeowners who purchased in the past five years, over 30% are underwater, and 
perhaps a quarter of all residential mortgagors are underwater.  Unfortunately, foreclosures 
create negative feedback loops that result in more foreclosures.  Foreclosures push down housing 
prices.  Depressed housing prices contribute to negative equity.  And negative equity encourages 
strategic defaults and more foreclosures.   
Rising unemployment will only exacerbate the problems of negative equity.  When a 
home is both underwater and the monthly payments are unaffordable out of current earnings, a 
default is nearly inevitable.  Not surprisingly, defaults are spreading into the conventional prime 
market, jumbo prime, second lien, and HELOC markets, with unemployment and negative 
equity, rather than payment reset shock as drivers.  Prime defaults and foreclosures started to 
surge sharply at the close of 2008 and have continued to do so into 2009.  (See Chart 2, below.) 
Chart 2:  Prime Mortgage Delinquencies and Foreclosures7 
 
 
III.  Housing Futures Predict Further Market Declines and a Slow Recovery 
 These are not just my pessimistic predictions, or even those of bearish analysts.  It is also 
what the market as a whole believes.  U.S. housing market futures based on the Case-Shiller 
Home Price Index are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  The Index is pegged to 
January 2000 as 100.  At its peak in June 2006, the Index was at 226.29.  As of April 2009, the 
Case-Shiller Index stands at 150.34, a 33% drop from peak.  The futures market anticipates it 
falling to a low of 133.6 in May 2010 (down 41% from peak) and still not climbing above 160 in 
November 2013 (down 29% from peak), which is where it stood in January 2009 and October 
                                                 
7 Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Surveys. 
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2003.  In other words, the market anticipates that housing prices will only rise 6% over the next 
four years.  (See Chart 3.)  
Chart 3:  S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 10 Home Price Index and Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange Futures on Composite 10 Index 
 
 
While this would mean the housing market hitting a bottom and recovering somewhat, it 
also means that it will take four years for prices to get back to their already depressed values of 
this year.  It also means that many of the families that took out mortgages between 2003 and 
2008 will have negative equity in their homes.   
This presents a problem not just for current foreclosures, but for years into the future.  
The nature of life is that people have different housing needs at different stages of life and have 
to move from time to time.  The birth of children, illness, death, divorce, and new jobs all 
necessitate moves.  If a homeowner who has to move has negative equity, the choice is between 
foregoing the move, somehow finding the cash to make up the negative equity, and losing the 
house in foreclosure.  Many will choose the foreclosure route, and this means years of elevated 
foreclosure rates, even if there will not be an acute crisis.   
Not only does this mean more families losing their homes in foreclosure, more losses for 
lenders and MBS investors, and more blighted properties for communities, but it also means that 
true stabilization for the U.S. housing market will be delayed and investors will have difficulty 
pricing investments because of uncertainty about default rates. As the Congressional Oversight 
Panel noted in its March 2009 report on the foreclosure crisis: 
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Homeowners with negative equity cannot sell their homes unless they can make 
the balloon payment that lurks in the background. Many homeowners will 
eventually need to move for jobs, for assisted living, for larger or smaller living 
spaces, or to be near family.  If they can find rental housing at an equivalent 
monthly payment price, they will abandon homes burdened by negative equity. 
Significant negative equity raises the serious risk that foreclosures have merely 
been postponed, not prevented.  
 
Negative equity will create significant distortions in the labor, elderly care, and 
housing markets. Moreover, negative equity will keep foreclosures above their 
historically low levels.  These delayed foreclosures will continue to plague the 
U.S. housing market and financial institutions’ books for decades.8  
 
Unfortunately, none of the current loan modification or refinancing efforts attempt to deal with 
the negative equity problem in a way that offers a long-term solution.  The Home Affordable 
Refinance Program permits borrowers with loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to refinance at up to 125% of the property’s current appraised value.  This allows 
underwater homeowners to lower their monthly payments, which addresses affordability issues.  
But it also means that these homeowners will still be paying mortgages on loans worth far more 
than their houses (and assuming a 7% broker’s fee on sale, anyone with a 93% LTV ratio or 
higher is effectively underwater).  Some individuals might be willing to pay a 25% premium to 
retain their home.  But for others that will prove too much, if not immediately, than in the near 
future when life events present an impetus to relocate.  
 
 To recapitulate: 
 
• We know we are in the midst of an economic catastrophe for the American family and for 
many communities and that more trouble is to come.   
• We know that these problems are likely to last not just for another six months, but for 
several years, and that they will place a drag on the entire economy, ensuring that 
recovery, whenever it comes, will be slow.   
• We know that there are two factors driving defaults on mortgages—unaffordable 
payments (often due to rate resets and unemployment) and negative equity (due to high 
initial loan-to-value ratios and falling housing prices).   
• We know that foreclosures place downward pressure on home prices and beget more 
foreclosures, creating a negative feedback loop or death spiral in the housing market.   
• We know that there still aren’t nearly enough loan modifications being done to offset the 
tide of foreclosures.   
• We know that almost no loan modifications address negative equity by reducing principal 
balances.  Of the 185156 loan modifications in the first quarter of 2009, only 3,389 or 
                                                 
8 Congressional Oversight Panel, The Foreclosure Crisis:  Working Toward a Solution, at 
http://cop.senate.gov/reports/library/report-030609-cop.cfm, at 50. 
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1.8% involved principal balance reductions, and all but four of these were for loans held 
in portfolio, rather than securitized.9   
• We also know many loan modifications do not address affordability by reducing monthly 
payments.  45.8% of the loan modifications done in the first quarter of 2009 resulted in 
monthly payments remaining unchanged or even increasing (in 18.5% of cases).10 
• We also know that we still don’t have consensus about why the numerous refinancing 
and modification programs attempted by industry, the Bush administration, and the 
Obama administration haven’t made significant headway against the volume of defaults 
and foreclosures, but we can say that it is likely multicausal and not subject to a silver 
bullet cure. 
 
IV.  Bankruptcy Modification of Mortgages 
This situation leaves only one option on the table for the federal government:  permit 
homeowners to modify their mortgages in bankruptcy.  Whatever the factors may be that are 
inhibiting voluntary and government-subsidized loan modifications, they are immaterial if a 
mortgage loan can be modified in bankruptcy.  Permitting the modification of single-family 
principle residence mortgages in bankruptcy would create a mechanism that would address the 
negative equity problem as well as the affordability problem while also denying relief to 
speculators who would abuse the system, and homeowners who cannot realistically afford even a 
modified mortgage.11  This mechanism could be immediately available and would have no 
additional cost to the taxpayers, and it would not result in higher mortgage costs or less mortgage 
credit availability as long as lenders’ foreclosure losses remain greater than bankruptcy 
modification losses.   
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code permits qualified debtors to propose a 3- or 5-year 
repayment plan, during which time all collection actions against the debtor are stayed.12  Secured 
debts and priority must be paid in full,13 and the debtor’s entire statutorily defined disposable 
income must go to paying unsecured creditors.14  Upon successful completion of the plan, the 
consumer’s remaining pre-bankruptcy debts are discharged.15   
Within these parameters, however, the debtor has significant leeway to restructure or 
modify almost any type of debt.  Interest rates can be reduced, amortization schedules changed, 
                                                 
9 Office of Comptroller of the Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision, , OCC and OTS Mortgage 
Metrics Report, First Quarter 2009, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2009-77a.pdf at 21, 23. 
10 Id. at 25. 
11 It is important to emphasize, however, that even with cramdown, Chapter 13 cannot help a homeowner, 
unless the homeowner has regular income.  Regular income is a threshold eligibility requirement for Chapter 13.  In 
a two-earner family, there need be only one regular income, but if a family’s difficulty in paying its mortgage is 
caused by unemployment of the sole earner, Chapter 13 would not be an option.  The reason I emphasize the 
importance of regular income for Chapter 13 eligibility is that unemployment will be a major factor in the coming 
wave of foreclosures. 
12 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1328 (Chapter 13 provisions generally); 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Chapter 13 eligibility 
requirements); 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2005) (stay).    
13 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(5) (secured creditors must receive present value of their collateral or the collateral 
itself under a plan); 1322(a)(2) (priority creditors must receive deferred cash payments for their full claim).   
14 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2005).   
15 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2005).  There are certain exceptions to discharge.  Id. 
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loan tenors increased, and negative equity erased.  A consumer debtor can modify car loans, 
credit card debt, student loans, yacht loans, jet-ski loans, snowmobile loans, airplane loans, 
computer loans, jewelry loans, and appliance loans, as well as investment property mortgages 
and vacation home mortgages.  A consumer debtor can also modify a principal residence 
mortgage if it is a multifamily property.  This means that a consumer who rents out the basement 
or the attic can modify the mortgage on her house in bankruptcy.  The only type of debt that a 
consumer cannot modify in bankruptcy is debt on a single-family principal residence.16  
Currently, single-family principal residence mortgages must be repaid according to their original 
terms or the bankruptcy stay will be lifted and the mortgagee permitted to foreclose.    
The policy behind the special protection for single-family principal residences is that 
Congress believed in 1978 that if mortgage lenders were shielded from losses in bankruptcy, 
competition would ensure that lenders would pass on these gains to consumers in the form of 
lower mortgage costs, thereby encouraging homeownership.17 
Unfortunately, the economic assumption behind the special protection for single-family 
principal residence mortgages in bankruptcy is incorrect. It is unlikely that bankruptcy 
modification of mortgages will result in higher costs of credit or less credit availability, despite 
the banking industry’s protestations to the contrary.  The banking industry has not presented a 
scintilla of evidence that permitting cramdown would affect credit prices.  Instead, they have 
made declarations based on a simplistic economic view that greater access to bankruptcy 
necessarily results in higher costs of credit and lower credit availability.  The economics of 
bankruptcy, however, are more complicated.   
I have conducted the only empirical work on the topic,18 and the clear finding from my 
research is that mortgage prices are largely insensitive to bankruptcy modification risk. No 
premium compensating for bankruptcy modification appears in primary mortgage pricing, 
secondary mortgage market pricing, or, most crucially, in private mortgage insurance pricing, 
and there is no discernible effect on homeownership rates from the protection.  Permitting 
bankruptcy modification is unlikely to result in higher mortgage costs or lower mortgage credit 
availability.   
This should not be a surprising finding.  Lenders will only raise prices in reaction to 
permitting bankruptcy modification of all mortgages if it would result in greater losses to them 
than the alternative—foreclosure.  The choice a mortgagee faces is not bankruptcy loss versus no 
loss, but bankruptcy loss versus foreclosure loss.  So long as bankruptcy losses are smaller than 
foreclosure losses, permitting bankruptcy modification will not result in higher prices.  
Thus, it all comes down to the question of whether lenders lose more in bankruptcy than 
in foreclosure.  The best evidence on the question says they do not, and this is not surprising; 
bankruptcy law guarantees that lenders will recover at least as much as in a foreclosure.   
                                                 
16 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5); 1322(b)(2) (2005). 
17 Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).  The legislative history on the anti-
modification provision 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) is scant and not particularly illuminating of Congressional intent (it is 
more illuminating of Congressional skepticism in response to mortgage industry claims).  Moreover, the history of 
the anti-modification provision suggests that it was intended only to prevent adjustments to mortgage rates and 
amortizations, not interfere with 11 U.S.C. § 506, a generally applicable provision of the Bankruptcy Code that 
limits the amount of a secured claim to the value of the collateral, with any excess claim being treated as unsecured.   
18 Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis:  Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 
WISC. L. REV. 565 (2009).  
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Any attempt to mitigate foreclosures faces the challenges of quickly deciding which 
homeowners to help, addressing the twin problems of negative equity and affordability, avoiding 
moral hazard, and determining who will bear the cost of loan modifications.  Bankruptcy 
modification helps solve these very issues and can do so more effectively and cheaply than any 
other proposed solution.  Bankruptcy modification is also the only way to bypass the contractual, 
legal, practical, and economic problems created by securitization. 
Permitting mortgage modification in Chapter 13 would provide an immediate solution to 
much of the current home foreclosure crisis.  Bankruptcy courts are capable of immediately 
handling a large volume of filings, and the bankruptcy automatic stay19 would function like a 
foreclosure moratorium until cases could be sorted through. 
Bankruptcy modification would not yield a windfall to housing speculators or second 
home purchasers and would only help homeowners who could ultimately afford a reasonable 
mortgage.  A mortgage loan modification in bankruptcy can occur only as part of a repayment 
plan.  The automatic stay would likely be lifted on an investment property (or second home) 
before a plan could be confirmed.  Accordingly, speculators and homeowners intent on keeping 
their second homes are unlikely to file for bankruptcy to seek mortgage modification in the first 
place. 
To qualify for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, in which a loan can be modified, a homeowner 
must have a regular income,20 and Chapter 13 plans must be feasible given the debtor’s means.21  
This does not mean that any modification is permissible; federal common law of bankruptcy 
requires that modified loans reflect a reasonable risk premium for the debtor,22 and the 
Bankruptcy Code requires that a mortgagee receive at least the present value of the property.23  
Only a debtor who can afford a loan modified within these limits will be able to keep her home.  
Permitting bankruptcy modification of primary home mortgages thus steers a true course 
between extending the right sort of relief and not extending it too broadly. 
Nor would bankruptcy provide a windfall to homeowners in the event that property 
values appreciate in future years.  While the homeowner would benefit from future appreciation, 
lenders have no reasonable expectation of this appreciation.  Bankruptcy is supposed to, at the 
very least, give lenders what they would get in foreclosure, and when a home is sold in 
foreclosure, the lender gets cash for the value of the house, and does not receive any benefit from 
the property’s future appreciation.   
Bankruptcy modification would also provide a solution for both of the distinct mortgage 
crises—negative equity and payment shock.  Bankruptcy modification would help negative 
equity homeowners by eliminating their negative equity position (“cramdown”), which would 
reduce their incentive to abandon the property.24  Likewise, homeowners who are unable to 
                                                 
19 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2005). 
20 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2005). 
21 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2005).  
22 Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
23 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (2005).  See Stan Leibowtiz, New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. 
J., July 3, 2009; Congressional Oversight Panel, The Foreclosure Crisis:  Working Toward a Solution, at 
http://cop.senate.gov/reports/library/report-030609-cop.cfm. 
24 Chapter 13 “cramdown,” also known as “strip down” or “lien stripping” or “claim bifurcation,” is not to 
be confused with the unrelated but eponymous Chapter 11 “cramdown,” the confirmation of a plan of reorganization 
under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2005), over the objections of a dissenting class of creditors or interests.   
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afford their mortgage because of a rate reset could modify their loans to make monthly payments 
fixed and affordable level. 
Permitting bankruptcy modification would not create moral hazard for lenders or debtors.  
Lenders will lose loan value.  While they will generally do better than in foreclosure, and the loss 
is not because of bankruptcy per se, there is still a high price for lenders that will discourage 
reckless lending.  As for homeowners, Chapter 13 bankruptcy is not a “drive-by” process.  In 
order to receive a discharge in Chapter 13, a debtor must live on a court-supervised, means-
tested budget for 3 or 5 years,25 and fully repay certain debts, including allowed secured claims, 
domestic support obligations, and tax liabilities.26  There are also limitations on how often a 
debtor may receive a bankruptcy discharge.27  Nor would bankruptcy modification give 
homeowners a windfall.  At best, a homeowner with negative equity would end up with zero 
equity, not positive equity.  Given the large transaction costs to a sale, debtors are unlikely to sell 
their properties for anything beyond a de minimis profit over the next few years. 
Finally, one of the greatest advantages of bankruptcy modification is that it has no cost 
for taxpayers.  In an age of a trillion dollars in government bailouts, bankruptcy modification is a 
rare bargain.  Bankruptcy courts are well staffed relative to historic filing levels, and court fees 
cover the administrative costs of the process.  Bankruptcy modification has no cost to taxpayers, 
and stabilizing housing markets would greatly help economically beleaguered local 
governments.   
The foreclosure crisis is not about to stop any time soon.  Judicially-supervised 
restructuring of mortgages is the only tool we have left in the box.  It’s a tool we know can work.  
It’s a tool that can save hundreds of thousands of families their homes and help stabilize 
communities, housing markets, and the economy.  It’s time to use it.   
                                                 
25 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2005).   
26 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a); 1325(a)(5) (2005). 
27 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(7)-(9); 1328(f)(2) (2005). 
